Being Naïve or Putting Business First? by Deva, Surya
Being Naïve or Putting Business First?
Surya Deva 2021-01-19T14:25:59
The European Union would like to believe that it is acting robustly and cohesively
to promote human rights and democracy globally. The EU Action Plan on Human
Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, confirmed by the Council a few months ago,
reaffirms that respect ‘for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of
law and respect for human rights will continue to underpin all aspects of the internal
and external policies’ of the EU. Promoting “European way of life” is also one of the
six priorities of the European Commission during 2019-2024. In an interconnected
world, this goal can hardly be achieved fully or effectively if the Commission did not
promote these values outside Europe.   
Moreover, the EU gives key importance to responsible business conduct (RBC)
polices, including by supporting the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The European Commission is also set to
introduce a mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence legislation in
2021.   
Since the EU is ‘not prepared to stand by’ while serious human rights violations and
abuses are committed, on 7 December 2020, it introduced regulation 2020/1998
providing for sanctions against individuals or entities involved in serious human
rights violations and abuses.
This (self-)perception as a force of good in terms of RBC and human rights
protection might however be less accurate than many within the EU think. Some
details about the recent EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)
seem to spoil this rosy picture. Commentators have questioned whether China’s
promised commitments on sustainable development and labour rights really mean
much in practice. I pursue this inquiry further from the perspective of RBC and the
current human rights situation in Hong Kong.
The China context
It is worth noting at the outset that China poses a significant dilemma from a RBC
perspective: it is too big a market to be ignored by states or businesses; at the same
time, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to respect all human rights while doing
business in China. 
China has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Moreover, considering how much manufacturing has been taking place in China in
the past few decades, it is quite glaring that China has not yet ratified the four of
the eight Fundamental ILO Conventions: the Forced Labour Convention 1930, the
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 1948,
the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, and the Abolition
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of Forced Labour Convention 1957. All these conventions have been ratified
very widely. For example, 176 states have ratified the Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention, while 167 states have ratified the Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention. 
More importantly, certain fundamental labour rights bind all ILO members regardless
of their ratification of the relevant ILO conventions. The 1998 ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work commits all ILO member states
to respect and promote principles and rights in four categories even when they
have not ratified the relevant conventions. The elimination of forced or compulsory
labour as well as freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining are part of these four categories of principles and rights which
the Chinese government should respect and promote irrespective of whether it has
ratified the relevant ILO conventions or not.
One must also consider that the Chinese system does not provide any opportunity
for ‘course correction’ on human rights: courts lack both independence and judicial
review power, there are no checks and balances between the executive and the
legislature, hardly any internal checks currently exist within the Chinese Communist
Party, and there is not much space for independent media or civil society to question
government abuses. Therefore, even if the Chinese government ratified the ILO
Conventions related to forced labour, there will be no independent mechanisms to
monitor the effective implementation of these conventions. In other words, not much
is likely to change on the ground.
Business responsibility to respect human rights 
By virtue of the UNGPs and other international standards such as the ILO Tripartite
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, all businesses – including those
wishing to invest in China under the CAI – are expected to respect all internationally
recognised human rights throughout their operations. This means that business
enterprises should not cause, contribute to or be directly linked to adverse human
rights impacts through their operations, products or services by their business
relationships.
How can businesses discharge this extensive responsibility? They should conduct
regular human rights diligence (HRDD) to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for
how they address their adverse human rights impacts. This process entails doing
meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other stakeholders.
However, as noted above, because of the unique operating context in China, it may
not be possible to do so in practice, especially if human rights issues are politically
sensitive. Moreover, as there are no independent trade unions in China, all unions
must be affiliated with the Party-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions.    
Will the CAI assist or hinder EU companies investing in China to meet their human
rights responsibilities? Based on the information available so far, the CAI might
become a trap for EU investors: while EU companies would be tempted to invest
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in manufacturing in China because of huge opportunities, they might be unable
to do business there in line with international or EU standards related to RBC.
The situation might become worse after the enactment of the mandatory HRDD
legislation in the EU. European companies can expect to be sued in the EU and also
face civil society campaigns for how they operate in China. Such campaigns need
not be limited to address alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
At the same time, it is arguable that CAI could enhance the leverage of the EU and
its companies investing in China to improve the human rights situation in the country.
This may, for example, facilitate peer learning and allow EU companies to build on
existing RBC initiatives in China such as the Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for
Responsible Mineral Supply Chains and push for mandatory ESG disclosure by all
businesses operating in China. However, to achieve these objectives, the CAI would
have to set time-bound measurable goals that could be verified by independent
sources in an objective manner, rather than go by rhetorical commitments.
Human rights in Hong Kong under the shadow of
Beijing’s National Security Law
Depending upon who one asks and how one construes the rule of law, Hong Kong
is in a ‘free fall mode’ or ‘back on track’ because of the National Security Law (NSL).
Although a NSL was desirable for Hong Kong, it should have been enacted ‘on
its own’ by the Hong Kong government as mandated by Article 23 of the Basic
Law. Doubts have been raised about the legality of how China’s National People’s
Congress (NPC) authorized its Standing Committee to enact the NSL with no
meaningful consultation with Hong Kong people. Since the NSL goes against the
letter and spirit of Hong Kong’s Basic Law as well the Sino-British Joint Declaration,
it is also arguable that the NSL is of ‘suspect constitutionality’, because any action
of the NPC or its Standing Committee must not amend the basic structure of Hong
Kong’s Basic Law. 
Although it was stated repeatedly that the NSL will only target ‘a small minority of’
criminals, the practice so far does not sit well with such an assertion. The arrest of
53 former lawmakers and activists for alleged subversion under the NSL – just a few
days after the CAI was announced – is a case in point. Their crime was simply to
organise an informal primary election with a view to win majority in the Legislative
Council and veto the budget as a bargaining chip with Beijing. Adopting such political
tactics will be entirely legitimate and constitutional in many democratic countries.
But no more in a post-NSL Hong Kong, when the government is using COVID-19 to
undermine civil and political rights.      
Even prior to the NSL’s enactment, serious concerns were raised about lack of
any effective checks on Hong Kong police’s exercise of power. The NSL has made
this situation worse by creating new opaque institutions tasked with administering
this law. Even judges handling cases under the NSL are to be designated by Hong
Kong’s Chief Executive and the Secretary for Justice may exclude a jury trial in
certain types of cases.
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At a broader level, what has been unfolding in Hong Kong in the last few years
provides glimpses of a clash between two governance models: the emergence of the
Chinese model of governance (and political ideas underpinning it) as an alternative
to the Western liberal model. The enactment of the NSL and its liberal use to crush
incrementally any dissenting voice in Hong Kong reflects this new unconstitutional
constitutional reality.
To conclude, human rights are costly business. The real commitment to promoting
and upholding human rights is tested in situations when doing so may result in
adverse consequences, economic or otherwise. The CAI provides a litmus test for
the EU’s commitment to ‘walk the talk’ on promoting human rights in China.
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